Abstract. We investigate probability logic with the conditional probability operators. This logic, denoted LCP , allows making statements such as: P s α, CP s (α | β), CP 0 (α | β) with the intended meaning "the probability of α is at least s", "the conditional probability of α given β is at least s", "the conditional probability of α given β at most 0". A possible-world approach is proposed to give semantics to such formulas. Every world of a given set of worlds is equipped with a probability space and conditional probability is derived in the usual way:
Introduction
The aim of probabilistic logics is clearly to capture the rules of reasoning about uncertain knowledge. One of the crucial issue in uncertain reasoning is the notion of conditional probability. Nilsson, for example, in a review [10] of work subsequent to his paper [9] , argue that the conditional probability of β given α reflects more accurately what we normally mean by the certainty of the rule 'if α then β', then the probability of α → β does. In recent times, many authors stress the importance of conditional probabilities. Some of them even suggest to consider conditional probability and conditional events as basic notions, not derived from the notion of unconditional probability. This idea is actually quite old, but some formal treatments can be found in Popper (1934 Popper ( , 1938 and de Finetti (1936 de Finetti ( , 1949 . The latter was the first who introduced the axioms for a direct definition of conditional probability (linking it to the concept of coherence, that allows to manage also 'partial' assessments). In [1] a rich elaboration of different issue of reasoning with the conditional probability, but only at semantical level, along the ideas proposed by de Finetti, is provided. In [6] we investigated a probability logic which 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 68T37; Secondary 68T27, 03B48, 03B70. Supported by Ministarstvo za nauku, tehnologije i razvoj Republike Srbije, through Matematički institut, under grant 1379.
enriches propositional calculus with a class of conditional probability operators of de Finetti's type. But, allowing iterations of probability operators in that framework could produce some problems. In this paper we consider probability logic suitable for reasoning about conditional probability that is based on Kolmogorov's approach, allowing the iterations of probabilistic operators and mixing of classical and probabilistic formulas. Let's mention that iteration of probability and mixing classical and probabilistic formulas are not allowed in most of the logic for reasoning about conditional probabilities that may be found in the literature. Higher order absolute (unconditional) probabilities were allowed in the logic presented in [11] .
The corresponding probability language is obtained by adding probability operators of the forms P s , CP s and CP 0 to classical languages. It allows making formulas such as P s α, with the intended meaning "the probability of truthfulness of α is greater than or equal to s" and CP s (α | β), with the intended meaning "the conditional probability of truthfulness of α given β is greater than or equal to s". The probability operators behave like modal operators. As the corresponding semantics we introduce special types of Kripke models with addition of probability measure defined over the words. It is well known that if we have a finitary axiomatization, then the compactness theorem: 'if every finite subset of a set T of formulas is satisfiable, then T is satisfiable' follows easily from the extended completeness theorem ('every set of formulas is satisfiable'). The compactness theorem does not hold for LCP . Namely, consider an arbitrary classical formula and the set T = {¬P =0 ϕ} ∪ {P <1/n ϕ : n is a positive integer}; although every finite subset of T is satisfiable, the set T itself is not. A consequence is that, if we want the extended completeness theorem, we cannot obtain a finitary axiomatization. Building on [8, 12, 13, 14, 17], we define a system which we show to be sound and complete, using infinitary rules of inference (i.e., rules where a conclusion has a countable set of premises).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the syntax of the logic is given. Section 3 contains a description of the corresponding Kripke-style models and satisfiability and validity notions. A formulation of a sound and complete axiomatic system can be found in Section 4. Proofs of Soundness and Completeness theorems are presented in Section 5. The decidability is discussed in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7 with some remarks about similar approaches, open questions and further investigations.
Syntax
The language L of LCP consists of a countable set I = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . } of propositional letters, classical connectives ∧ and ¬, a list of unary probabilistic operators P s and binary probability operators CP s for every rational number s ∈ [0, 1], CP 0 and parentheses. The set For LCP of formulas is the smallest set of a finite sequences of symbols of the language L containing the propositional letters and closed under formation rules: if α and β are formulas, then ¬α, P α, CP s (α | β), CP 0 (α | β) and α ∧ β are formulas. For example, the following is a formula:
We use the usual abbreviations for the other classical connectives ∨, →, ↔. It is convenient the following abbreviations in our logic, for every rational number s from [0, 1]:
, and:
•
Also, ⊥ is used to denote θ ∧¬θ, for an arbitrary formula θ. We use various conventions such as rules about deleting parenthesis and priority of logical connectives.
Semantics
The usual way of introducing probability is axiomatic through the measuretheoretic framework proposed by Kolmogorov.
A probability space (Ω, H, µ) consists of • a non-empty set Ω (called the sample space),
• an algebra H of subsets of Ω containing Ω and closed under complementation and finite union (but not necessarily consisting of all subsets of Ω), whose elements are called events (or measurable sets), • a finitely additive measure µ :
The requirement µ(A) > 0 is essential. If µ(A) = 0, then the conditional probability remains undefined. Let's mention that Kolmogorov's approach has become so entrenched that it is often referred to as the definition of conditional probability.
We use the possible-worlds approach to give semantics to probabilistic formulas. • if ϕ is a propositional letter, then: If
Axiomatic system
The axiomatic system Ax LCP for LCP contains the following axiom schemata:
(1) all For LCP -instances of classical propositional tautologies,
, and inference rules:
(1) From α and α → β infer β.
The above axiomatic system is extension of the axiomatic system for the unconditional probability logic analyzed in [11, 12] . The new axioms 7 and 8 and the inference rule 4 express the standard definition of the conditional probability. The infinitary inference rule 4 links, in the way to be expected, unary and binary probability operators Definition 4.1. A formula α is a theorem ( α) if there is an at most countable sequence of formulas α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α, such that every α i is an axiom or it is derived from the preceding formulas of the sequence by an inference rule. In this paper we will also use the notion of deducibility. A formula α is deducible from a set T of sentences (T α) if there is an at most countable sequence of formulas α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α, such that every α i is an axiom or a formula from the set T , or it is derived from the preceding formulas by an inference rule, with the exception that the inference rule 2 can be applied on the theorems only. A set T of sentences is consistent if there is at least one formula which is not deducible from T , otherwise T is inconsistent. A consistent set T of formulas is said to be maximal consistent if for every formula α, either α ∈ T or ¬α ∈ T .
The next theorem gives some auxiliary statements. (2) Let α, β, γ be formulas. Then:
Proof. 1. We use the transfinite induction on the length of the proof of β from T ∪ {α}. The classical cases follow as usual.
Suppose that β = γ → CP s (ϕ | ψ) is obtained from T ∪ {α} by an application of the inference rule 4. Then:
The other cases follow similarly.
2. We prove some of the statements, while the other can be shown in a similar way [13, 15] .
(4.1) By Axiom 7, we have
, for all t. Then, by 4.1, we have P t (α∧β) → P t·s (α∧β), and hence CP 1 (α | β) P t β → P t·s (α∧β), for all t. An application the inference rule 4 gives CP 1 
. Now, by inference rule 4 (s = 1), we obtain CP 1 (β | α).
(4.1) Axioms 1-6 and Rules 1-3 imply: P =0 β → P =0 (α ∧ β) and P =0 β → ¬P r β, for every rational r ∈ (0, 1]. Then, for s = 1 and every r ∈ [0, 1] we have
, by Rule 4.
Soundness and Completeness
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness theorem). The axiomatic system Ax LCP is sound with respect to LCP Meas class of models.
Proof. Soundness of our system follows from the soundness of propositional classical logics and from the properties of probability, so we give only a sketch of a straightforward but tedious proof. We can show that every instance of an axiom schemata holds in every world of every LCP Meas -model, while the inference rules preserve validity.
It is easy to see that if α is an instance of a classical propositional tautologies, then for every model M and each world from M, w M α.
Axioms 2-8 concern to the properties of measures and obviously holds in every world of a model. For example, let us consider Axiom 6. Let M be an LCPmodel and w an arbitrary world from M. 
Since the set of premisses holds in w, and w M P r β, for every r r 0 , it must be µ(w) ( 
In order to prove the completeness theorems for our logics, we show that every consistent set of sentences is satisfiable. We describe how a consistent set T of sentences can be extended to a suitable maximal consistent set, and how a canonical model can be constructed out of such maximal consistent sets. Finally, we prove that for every world w from the canonical model, a sentence α is satisfied in w if and only if α ∈ w, and as a consequence we obtain that the set T is satisfiable. Proof. Let T be a consistent set of formulas and let α 0 , α 1 , . . . be an enumeration of all formulas. We define a sequence of sets T i , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . such that:
( γ, is also added to T i+1 , so that T i+1 is consistent, (4) if T i+1 is obtained by adding a formula of the form ¬(β → CP s (γ | δ)), then for some rational number r ∈ (0, 1), β → ¬(P r δ → P r ·s (γ ∧ δ)), is also added to T i+1 , so that T i+1 is consistent.
The set obtained by the step 1 is obviously consistent. The step 2 produces consistent sets, too. For if T i , α i ⊥, by the deduction theorem we have T i ¬α i , and since T i is consistent, so it is T i ∪{¬α i }. Consider the step 3. If T i ∪{β → P s γ} is not consistent, then the set T i can be consistently extended as it is described above. Suppose that it is not the case. Then:
Since T i ∪ {β → P s γ} is not consistent, from T i β → P s γ it follows that T i is not consistent, a contradiction. Thus, the step 3 produces consistent sets. Finally, consider the step 4 of the construction. If the set T i ∪ {¬(β → CP s (γ | δ))}, is not consistent, then the set T i can be consistently extended as it is described above. Suppose that it is not the case. Then:
, by the inference rule 4.
Thus, T i is not consistent, a contradiction; hence, the step 4 produces consistent sets.
Let T = ∪ i T i . We can show that T is a deductively closed set which does not contain all formulas, and as a consequence that T is consistent. First note that for every sentence α, if T i α, then it must be α ∈ T . For if α = α k , and α ∈ T , then T max{i,k}+1 α and T max{i,k}+1 ¬α, a contradiction. Let α be a sentence, and T α. If the deduction of α from T is a finite sequence, then there is some i 0 such that T i α, and α ∈ T . Suppose that the sequence β 1 , β 2 , . . . , α of formulas which forms the proof of α from T is countably infinite. We can show that for every i, if β i is obtained by an application of an inference rule, and all the premises of β i belong to T , then β i ∈ T . Suppose β i is obtained by the inference rule 1 and its premises β 1 i and β 2 i belong to T . There must be some k such that β
If β i is obtained by the inference rule 2, then β i is a theorem and it must be β i ∈ T . If it is not, then α k = ¬β i ∈ T k+1 , and T k+1 is not consistent. Suppose that β i = β → P s γ is obtained by the infinitary inference rule 3, and that the premises β 
There is a set T m which also contains these formulas. It follows that T m ∪ {β} is not consistent, and β ∈ T . There is some j such that ¬β ∈ T j , T j β → ⊥, T j β → P s γ, and β → P s γ ∈ T , a contradiction. Finally, suppose that β i = γ → CP s (ϕ | ψ) is obtained by the infinitary inference rule 4, and that the premises β j i = γ → (P rj ψ → P rj ·s (ϕ∧ψ)) belong to T (r 1 , r 2 , . . . is an enumeration of all rational numbers from (0, 1)).
There is a set T k which contains formulas γ → (P rj ψ → P rj ·s (ϕ ∧ ψ)) and γ → ¬(P rj ψ → P rj ·s (ϕ ∧ ψ)). It follows that T k ∪{γ} is not consistent, and γ ∈ T . Then there is l such that ¬γ ∈ T l , T l γ → ⊥ and T l γ → CP s (ϕ | ψ), a contradiction. Thus, the set T is deductively closed. It does not contain all formulas. If for some α, both α and ¬α belong to T , then there is a set T i such that α, ¬α ∈ T i , a contradiction because every T i is consistent. Thus, T is consistent.
From the step 2 of the construction, it follows that the set T is maximal.
The next theorem summarizes some obvious properties of the maximal consistent sets of formulas.
Theorem 5.3. Let T be a maximal consistent set of sentences. Let α and β be sentences. Then the following hold:
If r is a rational number and r = sup{s :
Proof. As an example we prove 6. Let r = sup{s : P s α ∈ T }. By the inference rule 3, T P r α, and, since T is deductively closed set, P r α ∈ T . The other cases follow similarly.
Theorem 5.4 (Completeness theorem). Every consistent set T of formulas has an LCP Meas -model.
Proof. Let T be a consistent set of formulas. Let the tuple M = (W, v, Prob) be defined as follows:
• W is the set of all maximal consistent sets,
• v : W × I → {true, false} is an assignment such that for every world w ∈ W and every propositional letter p ∈ I, v(w, p) = true iff p ∈ w, • Prob(w) = (W (w), H(w), µ(w)) is a structure such that: 
Thus, for every w, H(w) is an algebra of subsets of W (w). Now, we will show that the following hold for all sentences α, and β, and every w ∈ W :
(
is a finite additive probability measure on H(w).
It is enough to prove that [α] ⊂ [β] implies µ(w)([α]) µ(w)([β]). From [α] ⊂ [β] it follows that ¬(α ∧ ¬β)
, and P 1 (α → β). If P s α ∈ w, then by Theorem 4.1. 4.1, P s β ∈ w, and we conclude that µ(w) ( 
Suppose that r = 1. Then, by Theorem 5.3. 6 we have P 1 α = P 0 ¬α = ¬P >0 ¬α, and ¬P >0 ¬α ∈ w. If for some s > 0, P s ¬α ∈ w, by the axiom 3' it must be P >0 ¬α ∈ w, a contradiction. It follows that µ(w)([¬α]) = 1. Suppose that r < 1. Then, for every rational number r ∈ (r, 1], ¬P r α = P <r α, and P <r α ∈ w. By the axiom 3, P r α and P 1−r (¬α) belong to w. On the other hand, if there is a rational number r ∈ [0, r) such that P 1−r (¬α) ∈ w, then ¬P >r α ∈ w, a contradiction. Hence, sup{s : P s (¬α) ∈ w} = 1 − sup{s :
, by the step 3, we have r + s r + (1 − r) = 1. Suppose that r > 0, and s > 0. By the well known properties of the supremum, and monotonicity (Theorem 4.1.4.1) for every rational number r ∈ [0, r), and every rational number s ∈ [0, s), we have P r α, P s β ∈ w. It follows by the axiom 5 that P r +s (α ∨ β) ∈ w. Hence, r + s sup{t : P t (α ∨ β) ∈ w}. If r + s = 1, then the assertion trivially holds. Suppose r + s < 1. If r + s < t 0 = sup{t : P t (α ∨ β) ∈ w}, then for every rational number t ∈ (r + s, t 0 ) we have P t (α ∨ β) ∈ w. We can choose rational numbers r > r and s > s such that: ¬P r α, P <r α ∈ w, ¬P s β, P <s (β) ∈ w, and r + s = t 1. By the axiom 4, P r α ∈ w. Using the axiom 6 we have P <r +s (α ∨ β), ¬P r +s (α ∨ β), and ¬P t (α ∨ β) ∈ w, a contradiction. Hence, ([β] ). Finally suppose that r = 0 or s = 0. Then we can reason as above, with the only exception that r = 0 or s = 0.
Finally, by the induction on the complexity of formulas we can prove that for every formula α, end every world w ∈ W , w M α iff α ∈ w.
To begin the induction, let α be a propositional letter. Then,
s, and w M P s β. For the other direction, suppose that w M P s β, i.e., that sup{r :
by the well known property of supremum and monotonicity of µ(w),
= 0, and hence
µ(w)([β]∩[γ]) µ(w)([γ])

0, we have µ(w)([γ]) > 0 and µ(w)([β] ∩
[γ]) = 0, by Axiom 8. Then, there is t 0 > 0 such that t 0 = sup{t : P t γ ∈ w}, and hence there is rational number t such that P t γ ∈ w. So,
For every t < t 0 we have P t γ ∈ w and P t·s (β ∧ γ) ∈ w (by Axiom 7 and CP s (β | γ) ∈ w). So,
s). For every rational number t t 0 , and every rational number r r, we have P t γ, P r (β ∧ γ) ∈ w. Also, for every t > t 0 , ¬P t γ ∈ w. So, for every t t 0 , P t γ → P t ·s (β ∧ γ) ∈ w (t ·s t·s r), and for every t > t, P t γ → P t ·s (β ∧γ) ∈ w (since ¬P t γ ∈ w). Now, by the inference rule 4 we have CP s (β | γ) ∈ w.
Decidability
We will use a kind of filtration, as well as linear programming theory to show that the logic LCP is decidable. The cases θ = CP s (β | γ) and θ = CP 0 (β | γ) follow similarly. The model M * from the theorem has no more then 2 n worlds, where n is a number of subformulas of the considered formula α. Theorem 6.2. The logic LCP is decidable. conditional probability is defined syntactically. However, a complicated machinery of real closed fields is needed to obtain the corresponding sound and complete axiomatization. In [16, 17] a logic, which contains several types of probabilistic operators (including operators of the form "the conditional probability of α given β is s), is defined. The range of the probability functions is taken to be the unit interval of a recursive nonarchimedean field. Thus, it is possible to define another probabilistic operator with the intended meaning "probabilities of α ∧ β and β are almost the same" which may be used to model default reasoning. In [3] a treatment of nonstandard conditional probability by means of fuzzy logic is given. Using de Finetti's approaches to conditional probability, a fuzzy modal logic is introduced in [7] , such that for each pair of classical propositional formulas α and β, the probability of the conditional event "α given β" is taken as the truth-value of the (fuzzy) modal proposition P (α | β). One of the interesting problems might be to find axiomatization of the logic with higher order conditional probability operators of de Finetti's type. Namely, allowing iterations of probability operators can help us to formalize uncertainty of probabilities. Another direction for further research might be extending our logic to corresponding first order logics. All these formalizations can be seen as useful tool in modelling and understanding real-world problems.
